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China’s economic reform: Success, 
problems and challenges 
1 Introduction 
The rise of China is a major episode in world economic history. From the late 
1970s, China pursued market-oriented reforms and open policy. During the past 
two decades, China experienced extraordinary growth. Since 1978, GDP growth 
rates have averaged 10 per cent a year, and 10.7 per cent in the 1990s, rivaling the 
record achieved by Japan and the ‘Four Tigers’ (South Korea, Singapore and Hong 
Kong and Taiwan province of China) in their fast growing period.   
In a short span of time, China has experienced three historic transformations 
simultaneously. First, China is undergoing economic transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. Second, China is undergoing economic 
development from a traditional agricultural economy to an industrialised economy. 
Third, China is changing from autarky to an important player in the arena of world 
economy and politics. China’s experience provides an ideal laboratory for 
economic research. The study of the Chinese economy can not only shed light on 
the causes and process of this massive growth surge, but also enrich our 
understanding of policy reform and institutional changes.   
With China’s growth occurring at a bewildering speed and arising from complex 
processes, it is not surprising that there has been much debate among economists 
over the basic interpretation of China’s success. While some scholars tell us about 
‘the China Miracle’ (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996), others claim ‘Growth without Miracle’ 
(Garnaut and Huang 2001). The experimentalist school highly praises China’s 
gradual, piecemeal reform and believes the hybrid institutions (such as township 
and village enterprises, or TVEs) reflect the distinctive Chinese social and cultural 
background and are a genuine innovation of the Chinese political leaders. The 






that China needs for long-term growth has to converge to the best international 
practices in advanced economies (Sachs and Woo 2000).   
China’s explosive growth challenges many widely accepted tenants of policy 
analysis. Private ownership, democracy, and the rule of law, which are seen by new 
classical economists as necessary to economic development, were notably absent, 
at least at the earliest stage of China’s reform. China is just like a student who 
never does his homework, but always outperforms his classmates in examinations. 
Why is the story of China unique? Is China showcasing a new type of economic 
system that is different from both socialism and market economy but is superior to 
both in stimulating economic performance, or are China’s experiments mainly the 
product of political constrains rather than economic optimisation? Do we have the 
confidence to say that past success can guarantee future prosperity? What are the 
major challenges and constrains that China is facing?   
This paper does not have the ambition to answer all these questions, but provides 
a survey and a preliminary analysis of China’s economic reform. Section 2 provides 
a brief overview of China’s economic development from 1949 to the present. 
Section 3 analyses the economic reform of the early 1980s. The planned economy 
was not sustainable because the government found that it increasingly difficult to 
keep a high growth rate and fulfil the goal of full employment. The reform took a 
gradual approach and the rise of the non-state sector made a major contribution 
the China’s growth.   
Section 4 discusses the formation of the triangle of the state-owned-banks (SOBs), 
the state-owned-enterprises (SOEs), and the government. We believe the 
equilibrium and dynamics among these three key players can largely explain the 
path and pattern of economic reform during the 1980s and 1990s. Section 5 
provides another factor to explain China’s economic reform, namely, the 
central-local relationship. The competition and tension between the central and 
local government has a tradition of thousands of years in China and still plays an 
important role in the formation and evolution of China’s economic system.   
Section 6 looks into the future and summarises the remaining tasks for China to 
accomplish in the near future in order to sustain high economic growth and social 
stability. We argue that China is facing an internal and external imbalance and a 
favourable policy package should help to maintain macroeconomic stability in the 
short term as well as pave the way for sustainable growth in the future. Section 7 
tries to identify the key elements for a successful reform in China in the 21
st 
century — what should be the strategic triggers for the reform, whether the 
current institutions are supportive to the reform, and how to find a potential 
institution which can act as a facilitator and coordinator for the reform.   
2 Economic  background 
In the early 1950s, GDP per capita in China was less than 119 Yuan or US$ 40 
(current prices). From 1953 to 1978, China’s annual growth rate of GDP averaged 






the ‘Four Tigers’, but higher than the ASEAN countries. In the 1970s, China’s 
growth was lower than both the ‘Four Tigers’ and the ASEAN countries.   
Although China’s economic growth rate was comparatively speaking fairly 
remarkable during this period, the growth was not stable. The growth process was 
frequently interrupted by political campaigns like the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 1958 
and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ from 1966 to 1976. Eckstein (1977) pointed out that 
China’s economic growth experienced a ‘policy cycle’. China’s economic policies 
changed so quickly that they hardly lasted for three years, which lead to the boom 
and bust of the Chinese economy.   
In the late 1970s, China embarked on a major program of economic reform. The 
last two decades have witnessed the dramatic transformation of the Chinese 
economy. During this period, real GDP growth averaged 9.5 per cent a year. In 
1980, per capita income in China was RMB 460 Yuan (less than US$ 150), and in 
2004, this figure had reached RMB 10,128Yuan (or US$1,224), with major cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai approaching US$ 2,500. Even taking inflation into 
consideration, the Chinese people’s living standards have risen almost sixfold in 
the last 20 years. If calculated on a purchasing power basis, the increase in the size 
of Chinese economy is even more impressive. The IMF found that on a 
purchasing power basis, the Chinese economy in 1990 accounted for just over 6 
percent of world output, ranking third behind the United States and Japan (IMF 
1993). More recent research by the World Bank suggests that based on purchasing 
power parity, China ranked the second largest economy in the world behind only 
the United States (World Bank 1997).   
Before China launched its open door policy from the late 1970s, it was isolated 
from the world economy. China’s exports were only US$ 18 billion in 1978, its 
share of world trade was only 0.6 per cent. China was the 34th largest exporting 
country in the world. In the last two decades, China quickly transformed itself to 
an important trading power. Its foreign trade has increased almost 15 per cent 
annually in the past 20 years. In less than two decades, the total value of China’s 
exports has expanded more than twenty-fold. In 2005 China’s exports were US$ 
762 billion, its imports were US$ 660 billion. Its trade dependence, measured by 
the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP, was about 63 per cent.   
In the late 1970s China was also a negligible participant in world capital markets. 
China scarcely had any foreign direct investment or foreign debt before the 
economic reform. This situation did not change much in early 1980s. Total foreign 
investment from 1979 to 1982 was less than US$ 12.5 billion, an average of about 
US$ 3 billion per year. In the early 1990s, China launched a new round of reforms 
and adopted more open foreign investment policies. After that, China experienced 
a dramatic increasing in foreign direct investment (FDI). Attracted by high 
expected returns and tax exemptions, FDI inflows increased by almost 50 per cent 
annually from 1992 to 1996. The trend has continued even after the Asian financial 
crisis. From 1993 China began to attract far more foreign direct investment than 






billion, second only to the United Kingdom and the United States (Ministry of 
Commerce 2006).   
From other indicators, the change in China is also very impressive. Life expectancy 
at birth from 1960 to 1965 was 36.3, the lowest in East Asia. During the past thirty 
years this figure has increased continuously. By the year 2005, life expectancy at 
birth was 70 for males and 74 for females (WHO, 2006). Around 80 per cent of 
China’s population was illiterate before 1949. By the mid-1990s, China had 
achieved virtually universal enrolment in primary education (Wang and Yao, 2001).   
The widening income disparity in China has caught much attention recently. 
According to Chinese official statistics, the Gini coefficient in China rose from a 
low level of 0.33 in 1980, to 0.40 in 1994, and to 0.45 in 2002 (UNDP 2005). 
[REFERENCE PLEASE] China’s current income gap has surpassed that in 
India and Ethiopia and China is now one of the countries with the most unequal 
distribution in the world. The deteriorating trend for China’s income distribution is 
the result of the growing urban-rural gap and regional disparities. The income gap 
between rural and urban areas decreased at the beginning of economic reform, 
owing to substantial growth of rural household income. However, since the mid 
1980s, the rural-urban gap has widened. The ratio of urban to rural income rose 
from 1.71 in 1984 to 3.23 in 2003. The uneven regional income gap between the 
coastal and inland areas has also expanded in recent years (Table 1).   
Table 1  Regional disparity: per capita net income of rural household 
(Yuan) 
Region 1978 1985 1992 1995  1998 2001 2004
Average 133.6 397.6 784.0 1577.7 2162.0 2336.4 2936.4
East region  164.1 513.0 1156.1 2346.1 3154.3 3832.1 4739.2
Central region  131.5 380.3 711.7 1422.3 2054.3 2177.1 2770.3
Western region  120.0 322.6 619.0 1051.6 1476.4 1692.7 2291.3
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2005. 
3  The political economy of the 1978 reform 
What was the impetus for market-oriented reform in China? Many papers hold 
that the inefficiency of the planned economy made it unsustainable. However, this 
theory cannot explain the timing of the reform. In our paper (Zhang and He 1998), 
we argued that the fiscal pressure faced by the government triggered 
market-oriented reform.   
The relation between fiscal deficits and institutional change originated from 
Schumpeter (1918). He pointed out that ‘the method of studying fiscal conditions 
is especially useful to analyse the turning point of social development’. A first 
glance may lead to doubts as to whether this ‘Schumpeter’s’ Law applies to China. 






The deficit in 1976 was the largest, but accounted only for 3.8 per cent of total 
government revenue and 1.0 per cent of GDP.   
Table 2  Fiscal deficits in the late 1970s 





  100 million Yuan 100 million Yuan 100 million Yuan  % %
1971  744.73 732.17 12.56 1.69 0.52
1972  766.56 765.86 0.70 0.09 0.03
1973  809.67 808.78 0.89 0.11 0.03
1974  783.14 790.25 -7.11 -0.91 -0.26
1975  815.61 820.88 -5.27 -0.65 -0.18
1976  776.58 806.20 -29.62 -3.81 -1.01
1977  874.46 843.53 30.93 3.54 0.97
1978  1132.26 1122.09 10.17 0.90 0.28
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2000. 
However, in the planned economy, the government controlled the allocation of 
capital, so the financial account automatically balanced. The official figures on the 
government budget hid the real cost of the planned economy. In order to maintain 
their legitimacy, political leaders had to maintain high economic growth and 
achieve full employment. On the eve of economic reform, these two goals became 
more and more difficult, if not impossible. Without reform, a fiscal crisis as well as 
a legitimacy crisis would have eventuated. 
First, in the late 1970s, the capital-output ratio increased sharply, reflecting that the 
government was injecting more and more money into the state-owned sector in 
order to sustain the previous growth rate. This put financial pressure on the 
government and gradually the growth rate declined, and so did people’s living 
standards. Thus the source for government revenue shrank and the 
discontentment of the people accumulated.   
Second, in the planned economy, with the growth of population and the increase 
of labour supply, the government found it increasingly difficult to provide jobs for 
everyone. Because of the budget constraint, only a small proportion of the 
population could obtain welfare and other amenities. The fixed number of job 
positions was in sharp contrast to the growing number of new labourers, including 
the younger generation in the cities. Many high school and college students fell 
into unemployment the same day as they graduated.   
The last resort of the government was to send tens of millions of young students 
( ‘Zhishiqingnian’, which means educated young people) to the countryside. From 
1962 to 1978, 17 million young students whose families were in the cities had to 
leave their parents and were sent to Dongbei, Neimeng, Yunnan and other remote 
rural areas, while almost all students whose families were in rural areas had to go 






young people came back to the cities and cheered the family reunion. This policy 
adjustment inceased the legitimacy of the new government led by Deng Xiaoping 
and his comrades. But the result was that the government then faced a serious 
fiscal problem. If the government still provided jobs for every unemployed 
‘zhishiqingnian’ via the government budget, the total expenditure would be about 
four to five times the annual government revenue (He 1998).   
The reform started from the late 1970s with a gradualist approach. More autonomy 
was given to enterprises, individuals and local governments to improve their 
incentives. The government withdrew from direct intervention, mainly to get rid of 
the heavy fiscal burden. The household responsibility system was introduced in 
rural areas. After paying contributions to the government, peasants could have 
residual claims. In 1978, when a rare drought hit Anhui province, several villages 
adopted the household responsibility system secretly. The government chose to 
endorse this grass-roots reform for fear that without giving autonomy to the 
peasants, another famine would come and shake the legitimacy of the government.   
The household responsibility system spread quickly, and by 1983 covered 93 per 
cent of rural villages. The impact was almost immediate: agricultural productivity 
increased substantially and so did rural people’s income. As Chinese economist Wu 
Jinglian pointed out: ‘The emphasis of economic reform had been put on the 
state-owned industry from 1950s to 1980s, but with no breakthrough. It was only 
after the wide implementation of household responsibility system that reform 
showed a promising future’ (Wu 1999).   
Efficiency improvements in agriculture created a grain surplus and extra labor. 
With the rise of income levels and demand for goods, Town and Village 
enterprises (TVEs) mushroomed and became a driving force for China’s growth. 
There is an on-going debate about whether China’s rapid growth during the reform 
period was mainly driven by productivity or factor accumulation. Chow (1993) 
concludes that from 1952 to 1980, capital formation played a principal role in 
China’s economic growth, while there was nearly no technological progress. For 
the reform period since 1978, Borensztein and Ostry (1996) find that the growth 
rate of total factor productivity rose to an average 3.8 per cent a year and 
accounted for more than one-third of the total increase in output. The non-state 
sector, including TVEs and later joint ventures, has been growing rapidly and 
attracting more and more labour. This labour mobility has proven to be one of the 
most important sources of productivity gains. During this process, the non-state 
sector also alleviated the unemployment pressure.   
The reform in the early stage was Pareto-improving. Vested interested groups did 
not lose their privilege while at the same time, the rest of people became better off. 
In the 1980s the Chinese government tried to copy the success of rural reform and 
introduced a similar contract responsibility system in SOEs. However, the situation 
in SOEs was quite different. As happened in other transitional economies, ‘insider 






SOEs. Salaries and bonuses increased very fast at the price of falling profits. SOEs 
provided larger housing, more jobs and other welfare.   
4  The triangle of State enterprises, State banks and 
government  
A natural result of the gradualist approach was that the distribution of national 
income became tilted to individuals rather than the government. As a result, the 
share of government revenue in GDP dropped sharply from 31.2 per cent in 1978 
to 22.4 per cent in 1985 and 10.8 per cent in 1996.   
As its fiscal capacity declined, the government began to shift the burden of raising 
funds to support SOEs to state-owned banks. Government intervention in 
economic activities was still pervasive, although less obvious. In 1984, the People’s 
Bank of China transferred its commercial banking function to the newly founded 
four specialised banks and assumed the role of central bank. The mono-bank 
system now evolved into a two-tier system. The reform of ‘loan for grant’ started 
in 1983. From then on SOEs turned to the state-owned banks for their funding. 
The debt ratio of SOEs increased substantially and in the 1990s this ratio was still 
above 80 per cent.   
Fiscal weakness and lack of a modern social safety network meant government had 
to count on SOEs to protect employment and provide social welfare. This 
approach sacrificed economic efficiency but could avoid social turmoil associated 
with ‘shock therapy’. SOEs were more like communities than profit maximising 
units. Most SOEs have their own kindergartens, schools and hospitals. The heavy 
social burden greatly hurt the competitiveness of the SOEs and eroded their 
profitability, which in turn resulted in the accumulation of non-performing loans in 
China’s banking sector. Government interventions also made it more difficult to 
evaluate the performance of the banks. The bank managers could easily shift their 
responsibility of bad loans to government since it was difficult or even impossible 
to distinguish the commercial losses and the intervention-induced losses.   
At the first stage of China’s reform, the triangle relationship between the 
government budget, SOEs and state-owned banks seemed very stable. Because of 
the high economic growth and the Pareto improving nature of the reform, the 
disposable income of households increased dramatically. Most of their money went 
to the state-owned banks because people did not have other alternatives to invest. 
More than 60 per cent of individual financial assets are in the form of bank 
deposits. The state-owned banks successfully collected money from households, 
and the government could conveniently utilise state-owned banks to transfer 
private savings to SOEs.   
Local government reinforced the ‘iron triangle’ between the government budget, 
SOEs, and state-owned banks. Unlike other planned economies, most Chinese 
enterprises are of small and medium size and local governments own most of the 






a long time, the branches of the state-owned banks worked in parallel with the 
local administration hierarchy. State-owned banks had their branches and affiliates 
in every province, every city. Because they were so closely related to local politics, 
branch managers often found themselves in a very difficult situation if they wanted 
to cut loans to ailing SOEs. These branch managers faced an asymmetric incentive: 
if they agreed to give loans to the SOEs but the loans turned bad, they could use 
government intervention as a scapegoat; if they extended loans at the will of local 
officers, they could improve their relationship with the local government and get 
rents. Thus it is no surprise to see that branch managers had an incentive to 
maximise their lending and then force the central bank to issue more money to 
finance their lending losses. This resulted in inflationary pressure and to a large 
extent, determined the boom-bust cycle in the socialist economic system.   
The soft budget constraint faced by SOEs and the moral hazard problem resulting 
from government intervention makes a large proportion of the loans extended to 
SOEs unrecoverable. Yet the funding keeps flowing into the state-owned sector. 
On the other hand, the vigorous and competitive non-state sector accounts for 75 
per cent of total output and more than 50 per cent of employment in urban areas, 
but cannot get sufficient financial support from the state-owned banks.   
We have sketched the complexity and the interconnectedness of reforms in SOEs, 
and in financial and fiscal areas. From the above discussion we can see that the 
banks’ problem is actually the problem of the ailing SOEs, and SOEs’ problem is 
actually the problem of an ill-functioning public finance system. Fiscal weakness is 
the Chinese economy’s Achilles Heel. How to solve the problem? The answer lies 
partly in strengthening fiscal revenue and domestic capital markets and partly in 
developing as quickly as possible a modern social security system.   
5 The  central-local  relationship   
One critical component of China’s economic transition is decentralisation. More 
autonomy was given to local governments and enterprises. Generally speaking, 
decentralisation helps to encourage local reform experiments and also gives local 
officials a strong incentive to stimulate economic growth. But at the same time, 
decentralisation also revealed and even exacerbated some of the deep-rooted 
problems in China’s economic and political system: local protectionism, rampant 
corruption, and increased inequality.   
It should be noted that even before China’s market-oriented reform, the economic 
structure in China was quite diversified. China never achieved a highly specialised, 
nationwide planned economy as in the Soviet Union. China’s economy consisted 
of parallel, and to a great extent self-sufficient, provincial economies. Using the 
vocabulary of Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975), Qian and Xu (1993) 
compare the Chinese economy to a multi-divisional (M-form) and the Soviet 
Union to a unitary (U-form) organisation.   
During the traditional planned economy, all revenues accrued to the central 






                                                       
Local governments were responsible for collecting taxes, but they had to remit 
most of their collections to the central government and wait for the central 
government to assign expenditures to them. As the agency of the central 
government, local governments did not have much discretion in their spending. 
Most of the fiscal revenue came from the profits of the state-owned enterprises. 
Thus the tax administration system was quite simple and crude. There were 
relatively few taxpayers (SOEs) and the accounts of SOEs were easy to monitor, 
since the government already controlled the price and production plan.   
The fiscal pressure at the end of the 1970s led to a series of major reform 
endeavours that shaped China’s central-local relations. A contractual revenue 
sharing system was introduced in the early 1980s. Central and local governments 
were asked to ‘eat in separate kitchens’ (fen-zao-chi-fan), which means the central 
and local governments now had their separate revenues. The central government 
negotiated with each province regarding the contractual terms of shared revenues. 
But these contracts strongly reflected the bargaining power of each province 
against the central government and led to widening disparities among different 
provinces. Although the central government revised these contracts several times, 
attempting to change the situation, the central-local government relationship 
remained uncoordinated and changeable.   
Although the revenue-sharing system provided a strong incentive for the local 
governments to promote economic growth, it also encouraged them to minimise 
the amount of revenues remitted to the central government. Local governments 
tried to transfer more revenues to their own pockets and as a result, 
extra-budgetary and off-budget funds expanded. A major source of off-budget 
funds for the local governments was profits from local enterprises. Thus local 
governments were then motivated to control local private enterprises in order to 
secure their own revenue streams.   
As a result, the central government’s share of total budgetary revenue declined 
from 51 per cent in 1979 to 28 per cent in 1993, while the ratio of total (local and 
central) budgetary revenue to GDP decreased from 29 to 13 per cent (Ma and 
Norregaard 1998). A climate of distrust surrounded intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. The central government blamed the local governments for the 
continuing fiscal decline and the local governments saw the repeated changes in 
revenue sharing rules as a lack of credibility of the central government. The 
deteriorating and chaotic fiscal position in the early 1990s led the central 
government to launch a radical reform in 1994. The revenue sharing system was 
replaced by a tax share system, which redefined the assignment of revenue between 
the central and the local governments.
1  
 
1 Central taxes include customs duties; the consumption tax; VAT revenues collected by customs; 
income taxes (from central enterprises, banks and non-bank financial intermediaries); the 
remitted profits, income taxes, business taxes, and urban construction and maintenance taxes of 
the railroads, bank headquarters and insurance companies; and resource taxes on offshore oil 






                                                                                                                                                   
The purpose of the 1994 fiscal reforms was not only to provide sufficient revenue 
for government, especially the central government, but also to redesign the tax 
structure and eliminate its distortions. From 1996, the revenue to GDP ratio 
started to increase. In 1996 it was 10.9 per cent and in 2004 it reached 19.3 per 
cent. The share of the central government in total revenue increased substantially 
from 22 per cent in 1993 to 55.7 per cent in 1994. The share of the central 
government in the total revenue then declined slightly in the late 1990s, but 
increased again from 1998. In 2004 this figure was 54.9 per cent. While more 
revenue went to the central government, the transfer payments from the central to 
local governments remain grossly under-funded.   
The issue of extra-budgetary and off-budget financing of local governments 
appeared to worsen after the reform. The 1994 fiscal reform only addressed the 
reassignment of revenue, but the expenditure assignments were left untouched. 
Local governments are responsible for the financing of social safety networks and 
minimum income support, as well as building new infrastructure and providing 
urban utilities.   
Local governments faced more intensive pressures to collect enough revenue. As a 
result, they had to rely on extra-budgetary and off-budget financing. A usual 
practice was to establish government-owned companies and use these companies 
to borrow money from banks. In recent years, local governments have become 
increasingly enthusiastic about land sales, because this has become the major way 
for local governments to increase their revenues. In 2003, 42.5 per cent of local 
government revenue was off budget, and the share of off-budget expenditure to 
total local expenditure was only 22.2 per cent. This implies that some of the 
off-budget revenue was actually used to finance the basic service expenditure, since 
the local government could not levy enough tax to cover these items (Hussin and 
Stern, 2006).   
The behaviour of the central and local governments can largely be explained by the 
fiscal constrains they face. With a deteriorating fiscal situation, each level of 
government tries to pass the fiscal burden to a lower level of government and to 
guarantee enough revenue for itself. The responsibility of providing public goods 
was gradually shifted to the lowest level of government, the county and village 
governments. County and village level governments now cover 70 per cent of the 
expenditure on rural education and 55-60 per cent of the expenditure on rural 
public health services. The fierce competition among local governments to attract 
foreign investments, their unbound avarice to grab land from farmers, their haste 
 
incomes), income taxes and profit remittances of local enterprises, urban land use taxes, 
personal income taxes, the fixed asset investment orientation tax, urban construction and 
maintenance tax, real estate taxes, vehicle utilisation tax, the stamp tax, animal slaughter tax, 
agricultural taxes, title tax, capital gains tax on land, state land sales revenues, resource taxes 
derived from land-based resources, and the securities trading tax. Only the VAT is shared, at the 
fixed rate of 75 per cent for the central government and 25 per cent for the local governments 






to sell SOEs, can all be attributed partly to the mismatch between revenues and 
expenditure responsibilities for the local governments.   
We do not see that so-called pro-market local government has became a check and 
balance to the central government. It is too simplistic to picture the local 
governments as reformists and the central government as conservative. The 
competition among local governments is actually good news for the central 
government because they can use yardstick competition to evaluate local officials’ 
performance. When there was disobedience in local governments, the central 
government did not find it difficult to fire those defiant provincial governors and 
impose its policy, as in the case of Beijing governor Chen Xitong and Shanghai 
governor Chen Liangyu.   
6 Unfinished  revolution:  Chinese economy at the 
turning point 
High economic growth is so important to China that if it drops a little to, say, 7 per 
cent, that would be regarded as a recession. Why so? My favorite metaphor is 
inspired by the Hollywood movie Speed. A terrorist has set a bomb under a bus. If 
the speed of the bus slows down, the bomb will explode; if the speed is too fast, 
the bomb will also explode. China is in a similar situation. A lot of problems lie 
underneath the high growth: increasing inequality, massive pollution, a fragile 
financial system, emerging issues such as energy security and political reform. We 
cannot stop the bus to dismantle the bomb. We cannot stop economic growth to 
reform the system. High growth can facilitate economic reform. It is much easier 
to launch a reform plan when the economy is growing fast. Growth provides more 
revenue for the economy as a whole and part of the new revenue can be used to 
compensate the losers and avoid backlash. Growth also increases the credibility of 
the government, which is very important for the success of policy. Recession, on 
the other hand, sends a signal about the incompetence of the government and 
ignites distrust as well as discontent in society.   
It is safe to say that in the near future, China will be able to sustain quite robust 
economic growth. If so, why should we bother to reform the economy? The 
problem is that China has entered a new era in its development process, with a set 
of challenges largely different from those of the recent past. Some of these 
challenges have arisen from the very pattern and success of high growth since the 
reforms began. If these challenges cannot be handled properly — and many argue 
China has left the harder fiscal reforms until last — China will lose its momentum 
of growth and, worse, the fruits of successful reform could be ruined by the 
resulting widespread discontent and instability.   
The major challenge for the Chinese government is to handle the internal and 
external imbalances and reorient the growth to a more sustainable path. Savings are 






Even compared to other East Asian economies, China’s savings rate is still 
extraordinarily high. One reason for this is the precautionary saving habits of 
households. The lack of a social safety net and the anxiety brought about by rapid 
social transformation are factors that cause Chinese people to save more. In most 
rural areas, for example, there is no medical insurance, nor any form of insurance 
to support the elderly. Another reason for cautious consumption is that, though 
government revenue increased dramatically in the last few years, it has mainly been 
channeled to investments on infrastructure projects such as highways and airports, 
rather than public expenditures on health, education and other ‘public goods’. 
Without sufficient supply, the prices for those public goods remain high and a 
once-universal welfare system has fallen apart.   
Table 3  Saving rate and the distribution of saving (per cent) 















1992  40.3 31.1 31.0 52.3 14.6 30.5  2.5 
1993  41.7 29.9 32.4 46.3 15.0 36.0  2.8 
1994  42.7 32.6 29.0 50.3 12.2 35.4  2.1 
1995  41.6 30.0 29.6 48.2 11.7 38.3  1.8 
1996  40.3 30.8 31.7 52.9 13.5 31.4  2.2 
1997  40.8 30.5 32.3 50.9 13.8 34.3  1.0 
1998  40.0 29.9 30.0 51.0 13.2 34.3  1.5 
1999  38.6 27.6 31.0 48.0 14.9 35.6  1.4 
2000  38.5 25.5 32.5 42.8 16.5 39.1  1.5 
2001  38.9 25.4 35.9 41.6 19.5 38.2  0.8 
Source: China Annual of Statistics, 1999-2004. 
In recent years, enterprise saving has also increased dramatically. Most of the 
profits have gone to a handful of large monopolistic SOEs and they have kept the 
profits in their own companies and own sectors. Small and medium sized 
enterprises, however, continue to have difficulty getting loans from the banks or 
getting listed on the stock market, so they have to rely on self-finance. They save 
their profit for investment.   
With domestic saving rising faster than investment, China’s trade surplus, which is 
equivalent to the savings surplus, has increased. Usually, when one country has a 
trade surplus, it will invest the revenue abroad and thus support a capital account 
deficit. By contrast, China has a ‘twin surplus’ of both the current account and 
capital account. This puzzling phenomenon can be partly explained by the ‘round 
tripping’ of Chinese capital going abroad and then coming back to China in the 
form of foreign capital to take advantage of preferential policies. This happens 






their revenues are judged by some to account for as much as 50 per cent of foreign 
direct investment.   
The external imbalance has two results. First, China has accumulated a large 
amount of foreign exchange reserves (now more than US$1 trillion). Although a 
country needs foreign exchange to pay its foreign trade and debts, too much of it 
becomes a burden. China invests between 70 and 80 per cent of its foreign 
exchange reserves in US$ assets, mainly US treasury bonds. The return ratios of 
US treasury bonds are so low that, taking inflation and operational costs into 
consideration, China is hardly breaking even. Further depreciation of the US dollar 
also exposes China’s foreign exchange reserves to more risks.   
Second, the pressure for the Renminbi (RMB, meaning ‘People’s Currency’) to 
appreciate is a key challenge for the Chinese government. The appreciation of the 
RMB will lead to a decrease in exports and increase in imports, thus directly 
reducing the trade surplus. But radical appreciation will have a negative impact on 
both the Chinese economy and the world economy.   
On 21 July 2005, the People’s Bank of China (the central bank) announced its 
decision to adjust the exchange rate policy. It revalued the exchange rate of the 
RMB against the US$ by 2 per cent and declared that the exchange rate would be 
decided by reference to a currency basket. However, 2 per cent is way below the 
widespread perception in the market of a required appreciation of 5-10 per cent. 
The ambiguity of the new regime discourages import and export enterprises 
because prices and profits are becoming unpredictable. It is important to set the 
rules clearly and adhere to the new rules. However, simply adjusting the exchange 
rate is not sufficient to correct the imbalances in the Chinese economy, because 
China’s trade sector does not seem to be very sensitive to the change. Appreciation 
of the RMB also has an undesirable income distribution effect, because imported 
agricultural products are cheaper and the market for domestic agricultural products 
will shrink and in turn lead to a decline in the income of rural farmers.   
A more appropriate policy should be to increase domestic expenditure. An 
increase in expenditure will lead to an increase in imports, and a decrease in the 
amount of domestic products available for export, thus helping to achieve a trade 
balance. An increase in public investment will also reduce the gap between 
domestic saving and investment, and drag China back to a more balanced path of 
growth. Compared with other countries, even developing countries with the same 
income level, China’s expenditures on education and public health are way below 
the average (Table 4).   
Table 4  Social expenditure of selected countries (percentage of GDP) 
Country Education  Public  health
Australia 4.8 6.4













Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2006) online database of Education Indicators and WHO (2006) 
World Health Report. 
The fiscal situation in China is very healthy. The primary deficit to GDP ratio is 
below 2 per cent, and the public debt to GDP ratio is only 26 per cent. In the last 
few years, the growth rate of taxation has outpaced the GDP growth rate by more 
than 10 per cent. It is fair to say that China still has quite a lot of potential to 
borrow money today without worrying about the burden of accumulated debt in 
the future.   
If we agree on increasing public expenditure, then where should we allocate the 
money? The public expenditure program should be concentrated on broad 
strategic areas that are most likely to create the conditions for future growth. It 
could include rebuilding a well-functioning social safety net for both urban and 
rural populations; increasing investment in human capital by providing better 
health and education; internal transportation and communication infrastructure to 
help achieve a more integrated domestic economy; and a rural development 
program for the poorest regions which have been left behind by the boom on the 
East coast and many of the 43 megacities. The new government is promoting a 
harmonious society; but a harmonious society can be achieved only by providing 
sufficient public goods as well as speeding up economic reforms.   
Many economists worry that public expenditure programs will lead to massive 
government intervention and corruption. This concern is legitimate and the public 
expenditure program should be carefully planned. But, compared to the past 
practice by which local government got their funding mainly through bank lending, 
financing them through the budget system is more transparent and easier to 
oversee. Modern history shows that democracy is not an artificially designed 
regime, but stems from the endless quarrelling, bargaining and compromising in 
the budget process. A well-functioning public finance system is the constitution for 
the market economy since it defines the boundaries between the government and 
the market. China can be transformed into a more prosperous, open and dynamic 
country by a public expenditure program and its hidden agenda.   
7  A new agenda for China’s economic reform 
China’s economic reform indicates that market economy is more than price 
liberalisation and privatisation. Many supporting institutions are equally important. 
During the transition period, sometimes the first best solution cannot be pursued 






designed plan, China has been muddling through all the unpredictable and 
complex situations and achieved remarkable success.   
However, the ‘cross the river by touching the stone’ approach adopted by the first 
generation reformists cannot guarantee that China can sustain its vigour. Without a 
comprehensive and forward looking plan, China’s economy may become stuck in 
the mud and lose its momentum. The issues that the second generation reformists 
now confront are quite different from their predecessors and a deeper process of 
reform is required.   
The first generation reformists were charismatic political leaders. A small handful 
of leaders can rely on the leverage of an authoritarian political system to pursue 
market-oriented reform. Give more freedom to the farmers and then there will be 
no famine. Give more freedom to private entrepreneurs and then all kinds of 
non-SOEs will mushroom. Give more freedom to local government officials and 
then they will change themselves from communist disciples to market economy 
preachers. All these reforms are politically difficult but technically simple. Let there 
be light and then there was light.   
Second generation reformists are promoted from lower rank bureaucrats. They do 
not have the aureole of the first generation political leaders. Most of the time, they 
have to make compromises with their peers and even subordinates. Thus it is 
understandable that the style of the new generation is consensus building. They are 
more careful and cautious. This approach prevents the government making fatal 
mistakes, but it may also cause the government to miss the best opportunities.   
The good news is that there is a surprising consensus across different levels of 
government and also across society on the need for reform. The central 
government must tap this sentiment to work out a comprehensive set of changes. 
The public finance system, financial sector reform, and social programs like 
education and public health should be the priorities of this new agenda for reform. 
The package of reforms will be complex, difficult and protracted. The second 
generation reform requires the political leaders to cooperate with both the local 
officials and officials from different departments of the Chinese government, and 
convene enough support from society.   
Tensions between the central and local governments stem from the mismatch of 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities. Knowing the local governments are 
constrained by their capacity to raise revenue, the central government has had to 
tolerate local governments seeking ‘self-reliant’ solutions outside the budget. It is 
time to change this situation and form a modern budget management system and a 
well-functioning public sector. The central government may need to write off the 
debt of the local governments as they have done to rescue State-owned banks. The 
local governments are in the red because they have had to shoulder the fiscal 
burden for the central government. New sources of revenue need to be designed 
for the local governments. For example, local government bonds should be 






where and how much public money is spent. The next step of the reform requires 
revamping expenditure assignments, revising revenue assignments, including 
conferring some real fiscal autonomy on local governments in exchange for 
extending budgetary scrutiny over off-budget resources, and revising the Budget 
Law to guarantee these assignments.   
The political leaders also have to work with officials from different departments of 
the Chinese governments. China has undertaken several rounds of administrative 
reforms. Administrative reform in 1998 downsized the original 40 ministries and 
committees to 29, and also downsized 50 per cent of government employees. The 
Chinese government has also established a merit based civil service system. In 
recent years, the Chinese government has not had any difficulty recruiting excellent 
and ambitious people.   
However, in many cases, government departments are becoming vested interest 
groups and the major obstacle for further reform. While the top leaders are trying 
to cool down the investment in real estate, the Ministry of Construction, however, 
often openly shows its sympathy to developers. The Ministry of Railway, which is 
responsible for both the pricing of and investment in railway transportation, is 
reluctant to increase investment.   
The coordination of different departments is another headache for the Chinese 
government. Channels for information sharing are impeded. When one 
government department issues a new policy, they are not required to inform and 
consult with other related departments. Responsibilities of each department often 
overlap with others and at the end, nobody takes any responsibility.   
Government reform should not be targeted at simplifying the administrative 
structure. A more important task is to redesign the organisation structure of the 
government. Some government departments have too much competency, 
including probably the National Development and Reform Commission, which 
inherited most of the power of the former Planning Commission. Other 
departments, like the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, need to have more 
jurisdiction and independence.   
No government agency is responsible for the design and review of economic 
policy from a nationwide view. The Economic Reform Committee used to play 
this role but was abolished in the 1998 administrative reform. It may be unrealistic 
to establish new agencies facilitating coordination among different departments, 
but sometimes a unified code can be introduced for every department to follow, 
thus reducing transaction costs in the hierarchy.   
What should the international community do to foster the next generation reform 
in China? In the 1980s, international organisations like the World Bank were very 
active and influential in China. Their influence faded, unfortunately. This is partly 
because of the learning curve, since Chinese officials and experts now know much 
more than before. But it is also because the international communities fail to 






general argument that China should pursue a market economy or more economic 
freedom, Chinese politicians need more detailed and tailor-made proposals. Such 
kinds of proposals should take China’s complicated political, economic and social 
situation into consideration. Outsiders’ policy suggestions have often been viewed 
as naive or unrealistic because they did not include those domestic factors.   
International communities can do better by targeting manageable objectives and 
providing user-friendly analysis. They can also do better by providing international 
experience, both the successful and failed examples. One good example is worth a 
thousand theories. This is especially true for most Chinese politicians, because they 
are trained as engineers, they are very practical and favour examples above abstract 
theories.  
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